The Democrats cave: No filibuster for extremist judges

I usually support moderation to left-right extremism, and hence moderate solutions to left-right paralysis, but the agreement between Republicans and seven moderate Democrats to allow three of Bush's extremist judicial nominees to go straight to a floor vote without filibuster -- reported here -- doesn't seem like much of a compromise to me. However much moderates like Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada, Robert Byrd of West Virginia, and Joe Lieberman of Connecticut are praising this last-minute effort to avert "nuclear" catastrophe in the Senate, it is clear that Bush and the Republicans have won. After all, the Senate had already confirmed the vast majority of Bush's nominees, and the "Odious Seven" left over are clearly extremists. See my recent post for a longer take on this. A better option is outlined by Mark Schmitt at The Decembrist (a great blog: see link, right), but now even that one is out of the question. Instead of moderate Republicans siding with unified Democrats to protect the filibuster (and hence indirectly to vote down Bush's extremist nominees), moderate Democrats have sided with unified Republicans (John McCain was "a chief architect of the deal") to guarantee confirmation for three of Bush's extremist nominees without effectively closing debate on the nuclear option, which may be used later to ram through a Supreme Court nominee. So what have the Democrats won? Nothing. Absolutely nothing.

Schmitt was right to point out that a compromise would have been "disastrous" for Senate Majority Leader (and 2008 aspirant) Bill Frist. Which is precisely why this isn't a compromise of any kind. The Democrats -- some of them, anyway -- have caved. This is a huge moral victory for a beleaguered Republican Party, and both the White House and Congress will no doubt seek to keep up the momentum going forward. Who are the cowards now?

UPDATE: Mark Schmitt's latest on the filibuster fiasco take can be found here: "If the goal of liberals is to block a truly extremist Supreme Court nominee, block Social Security privatization and more tax cuts, block Bolton, and then begin to shift the debate back to issues of economic security, health care, global leadership, etc., the best possible thing that can happen is for the White House and its agents, such as Frist, to lose their control of all the levers of power in Congress. That's indisputably what this deal does, and for that, I'll learn to love it." Schmitt offers three compelling rationalizations for why the "compromise" may not be so bad after all, but I'm not yet convinced. Then again, I'm allowed to remain unconvinced. Writing a blog and commenting on American politics allows me a certain distance from the real world, and, as Schmitt himself admits, "[a] deal that someone like me would be ecstatic about probably wouldn't attract much Republican support". Fair enough. We'll have to live with the deal and hope that, in future, Republicans won't once again threaten to use the nuclear option (thought I suspect they will). With time, I may come to see the wisdom of Schmitt's analysis. Right now, I see its outlines, but I'm just too angry to think clearly enough about the implications of this less-than-ideal compromise -- and learning to love it, if I may reference Seinfeld, seems like learning to love a football-sized boil growing out of the side of your neck.