Channeling identity politics in Iraq

Guest post by Peter Henne 

Peter S. Henne is a Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project and a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University. This is his sixth guest post at The Reaction.

He has previously blogged about Sri Lanka, the Afghan War, the Left and religion, and Obama and the Nobel Peace Prize, and Marc Thiessen. 

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The recent news that Ayad Allawi won a slim majority of parliamentary seats in the recent Iraqi elections was, to say the least, surprising: a secular Shiite formerly derided as a U.S. puppet won with the support of Sunni Arabs. Yet, it would be a stretch to say this proves sectarian divisions in Iraq have been rased. This election appears to show that identity politics in Iraq -- whether Sunni/Shia or secular/Islamist -- are both malleable and capable of influencing political outcomes. This seemingly contradictory state of affairs will bear greatly on efforts to deal with the threat of sectarian violence in the context of this contentious election and the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The question of identities -- the language through which individuals define themselves and determine their friends and enemies -- and political violence erupted in policy debates after the 9/11 attacks. Those attacks, and the later sectarian violence in Iraq following the U.S. invasion, seemed to indicate that, as Huntington warned, identity now drives politics, often in a distressing manner. Yet, post-9/11 developments counter a simplistic view of identity politics. Numerous Muslims have rejected al Qaeda's violent ideology, and Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq does not appear to be an outbreak of "ancient hatreds," as identities on both sides have proven flexible and allowed for reconciliation.

The malleability of identity in Iraq first suggested itself in the re-election strategy of the incumbent Nouri al-Maliki. He emerged as a compromise candidate in earlier intra-Shia parliamentary wrangling, and once in power was widely perceived as advancing Shia interests at the expense of Sunnis. In the current election, though, al-Maliki has responded to opposition among some Shia elements by reframing himself as an Iraqi nationalist, appealing to Sunnis for support. Yet, this was less the emergence of Iraqi nationalism than the cynical appeals of a skilled politician.

A similar trend is apparent in the candidacy of Ayad Allawi. The secular Allawi was the U.S. pick for leader after the invasion but lost out to more sectarian figures. He has gained ground against al-Maliki in this election through a secular platform. This does not indicate a rejection of religion among Iraqis, however; his biggest source of support is among Sunnis, who remain wary of al-Maliki.

Despite these signs of flexibility, it would be difficult to argue that identities do not matter in Iraq. Sectarian Shia voices -- such as Moqtada al-Sadr -- remain influential and have cost al-Maliki numerous votes. Moreover, even though al-Maliki's appeals and Sunni voting behavior display strategic considerations, it is still behavior along identity boundaries; al-Maliki's appeals are limited due to identity-based concerns, and pro-Allawi sentiment among Sunnis is still driven by Sunni solidarity.

We must move beyond perceiving identities as either primordial attachments or secondary to non-cultural interests. As events in Iraq show, leaders can both manipulate identities and be constrained by them. Even elite manipulation of identity demonstrates the value of the identity, as blatantly cynical rhetoric still resonates. And groups can act to advance material interests while still maintaining their cultural attachments.

Believing Sunni-Shia tension is inevitable is misguided, and can lead to the inadvertent hardening of these identities through attempts to keep the "ancient hatreds" at bay. But pretending that identity politics are completely the result of U.S. missteps or Saddam Hussein's dictatorship ignores the great value many people attach to their cultural identity. Iraqi leaders and international partners must find a way to both provide room for identity politics but channel these through a system perceived as fair by all.

If Allawi succeeds in forming a coalition government -- an uncertain outcome as al-Maliki is still maneuvering to change the electoral outcome -- he must deal with the persistent distrust between Iraq's ethnic groups. One strategy would be the imposition of an overriding identity, like Iraqi nationalism; such efforts, though, may be too reminiscent of similar attempts by past dictators, such as Siad Barre's "scientific socialism" in Somalia or even Hussein's Baathism. More effective, though, would be an effort to create room for identities to be expressed in Iraqi politics, channeling identity politics into a multicultural democracy similar to that in Canada or -- at the expense of sounding chauvinistic -- the United States.

This requires a leader who avoids sectarian appeals to increase political support, or does not provide differential benefits to supporters while publicly proclaiming national unity. Here, Allawi's situation -- disconnected from the powerful religious blocs among the Shia and reliant on Sunni support in the absence of ethnic affinity -- may actually be a benefit as he will be forced to provide public goods rather than stir up ethnic divisions. U.S. policy in the coming months, then, should be focused on both affirming the results of this seemingly fair election and providing Allawi the support he needs to form a government that channels identity politics without falling back on cynical manipulation of identities' darker side.

The latest problems in Iraq

By Michael J.W. Stickings

Update (6/15/08 - 12:51 pm): See WaPo today -- "Powerful Iraqi Cleric Recalibrates Strategy":

The movement of anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr said Saturday that it would not take part in provincial elections this year, one day after it formed a new paramilitary group to fight U.S. troops.

The back-to-back moves suggested that Sadr is trying to bolster his position as the chief opponent of both the American troops in the country and the Iraqi government, following a year in which he ordered his Mahdi Army militia to observe a cease-fire and moved deeper into the political process.

Sadr's aides said he is recalibrating his strategy as the American military drawdown transforms the U.S. role in Iraq.

Yet another massive problem. For more, keep reading...

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The Iraq War and Occupation is supposed to be the key issue this election -- or at least one of the key issues -- but we're not really talking about it all that much, are we?

At least not yet.

Perhaps once the campaign begins in earnest, after the conventions, or after Labor Day, when Obama's and McCain's starkly opposing views will be presented to the American electorate for its consideration.

While Obama has been opposed to the war from the beginning and is calling for withdrawal (as soon as possible, but acknowledging the difficulties that will accompany withdrawal), McCain has been, as you all know, one of the war's chief cheerleaders. He has at times been critical of some of the specifics of the handling of the war -- that is, of some elements of the gross mismanagement of the war by Bush and his warmongering underlings -- but he has been wildly enthusastic about the war in general, including the Surge that began early last year. It is not quite clear to me just what victory would mean for McCain, nor just what he considers to be the war's objectives, but, then, the definition of victory and the war's objectives keeps changing for Bush and his underlings, too. In that respect, McCain is just like the man he seeks to replace. (As Slate's Fred Kaplan has pointed out, McCain is much more of a neocon than -- and much worse than -- Bush.)

Suffice it to say that McCain thinks the war is worth continuing even without an end in sight and that the situation in Iraq is improving as a result of the Surge. But is the situation improving? As I have argued before, the Surge is not working, that is, has not met its stated objectives, specifically the stated objective of enabling a political settlement. While it is true that the security situation has improved in some parts of of the country -- more troops, more security, to a point -- it is certainly not true that the situation in Iraq has improved to the point where there is reason to be optimistic, let alone to the point where we could begin to talk about success in any realistic way.

And, today, there is even less reason to be optimistic:

The Bush administration's Iraq policy suffered two major setbacks Friday when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki publicly rejected key U.S. terms for an ongoing military presence and anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called for a new militia offensive against U.S. forces.

During a visit to Jordan, Maliki said negotiations over initial U.S. proposals for bilateral political and military agreements had "reached a dead end." While he said talks would continue, his comments fueled doubts that the pacts could be reached this year, before the Dec. 31 expiration of a United Nations mandate sanctioning the U.S. role in Iraq.

The moves by two of Iraq's most powerful Shiite leaders underscore how the presence of U.S. troops has become a central issue for Iraqi politicians as they position themselves for provincial elections later this year. Iraqis across the political spectrum have grown intolerant of the U.S. presence, but the dominant Shiite parties -- including Maliki's Dawa party -- are especially fearful of an electoral challenge from new, grass-roots groups.

Of course, the Shiites want the U.S. out because they're the ones in power in Baghdad, while the Sunnis are less eager to see the U.S. leave because some of them have strategically allied themselves with U.S. forces against al Qaeda and because they're in the minority and are not in power in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, there has been nothing in the way of political settlement, no success in building a genuine democracy in Iraq. The war unleashed long-dormant (because long-suppressed) sectarian tensions and, five years later, not much has changed.

Except that the Iraqis are now in agreement with the American people: It is time -- long past time -- for the U.S. to leave.

Which is something McCain, like Bush, just doesn't seem to understand.

Just another day in the life and death of Iraq LXXXI

By Michael J.W. Stickings

The headline at Juan Cole's place sums it up:

4 US Troops Killed;

Hundreds Flee Baghdad Clashes;

Ayatollahs Decline to Ban Militia

Read the whole post, including the McClatchy round-up at the end, but here are a few key passages:

-- "Guerrillas killed 4 US troops in Iraq on Monday, bringing the 2-day total to 9."

-- "Robert Reid of AP reports that hundreds of Iraqis fled the Shiite districts of Baghdad that are under siege by American and Iraqi government forces. The US and its Iraqi allies engaged in firefights on several fronts in the Shiite neighborhoods. US helicopter gunships and fighter bombers also fired missiles into the civilian neighborhoods. The attacks left 14 dead in the Baghdad area. The US military denies that its bombing of civilian neighborhoods kills innocent civilians. While I know they try hard to minimize collateral damage, the blanket form of the assertion is not plausible."

-- "The Baghdad fighting is the worst in about a year."

-- "[T]he US press went wild for this supposed report that Muqtada al-Sadr said he would dissolve his militia if Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani ordered it. Folks, he always says that when there is a controversy. (He said the same thing in spring, 2004). He says it because he knows it makes him look reasonable to the Shiite public. He says it because he knows that the grand ayatollahs are not going to touch the matter with a ten foot pole... So the idea that, having lost militarily, al-Maliki and his political allies (who are a minority in parliament now) could just a couple of days later jawbone Muqtada into giving up his paramilitary was always absurd."

But, of course, so much of this war and occupation is absurd. We might as well stand around and hope that Godot shows up to save the day.

Proving a point

By Carl

There's a curious dynamic involved in this story, one I haven't fully contemplated yet:

Iraqis returned to the streets of Baghdad after a curfew was lifted and the southern port city of Basra appeared quiet on Monday, a day after the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr called for his followers to stop fighting and in turn demanded concessions from Iraq’s government.

Mr. Sadr’s statement, released Sunday afternoon, came at the end of six days in which his Mahdi Army militia had held off an American-supported Iraqi assault on Basra.

OK, the most obvious bit of information we can glean from this story is that al-Sadr is establishing that he is firmly in control of the Shi'ite faction in Iraq. Is this a prelude to his taking over the parliament? Or worse? Is this a signal that Sayyid al-Sistani is preparing to rule over Iraq the way Ayatollahs in Iran have for decades, as "Expwert Jurist"?

After all, he's basically turned on, and then turned off, the faucet of violence, keeping American and British troops dancing in the background while he held off allied-armed Iraqi forces to a standstill.

Clearly, he wanted to demonstrate that the nation will dance to his tune.

He also demonstrated the abject impotence of the American-chosen president, Nuri Maliki, who apparently couldn't crush an uprising any more effectively than the American-led Coalition of the Bribed!

There is an allegory about the lion and the fly, which applies to Iraq: In a fight between a lion and a fly, the fly cannot land a killing blow, while the lion cannot fly.

So it goes with Iraq and the insurgency: we are fighting a fight that we cannot win, despite our overwhelming force, and the Shi'ites know this lion cannot fly.

The ironic thing about this is, this was a fight, and still is a fight, that we didn't have to fight. The sponsors behind this fight, the Iranians, are perhaps the most sophisticated democratic government in the area, just behind India. Yes, the Ayatollah in Iran has supreme power, but if you look at society, even Khameni hasn't been able to stifle all dissent, or make women wear the burqa, or...well, you choose the field, and Iran has advanced fairly far in it, comparatively speaking.

That's not to say we should be holding them up as a model of the Middle East we'd like to see, but we could try working with them to bring them into the fold, so to speak.

Ahmadinejad may come off as a fucking loon, but if you carefully look at the ripples that he sends out, there's a very deep logic to his insanity and it is very profitable to Iran and to its peer nations. And I have no doubt that he speaks for the Ayatollah.

(Cross-posted to Simply Left Behind.)