Of air strikes and political footballs

By Peter Henne

Sometimes I worry I'm too critical of both the government and major opposition figures in Pakistan, so take this with a grain of salt. But many leaders in that country seem willing to stir up either anti-American or religious sentiment (or both) to gain domestic support and distract potential critics.

This includes the government appealing to concerns over "blasphemy" in order to limit internet access. It also, unfortunately, includes attacks on US and NATO conduct in the war in Afghanistan. The most recent incident involves the Pakistani leadership criticizing a NATO air strike on Pakistani soil that killed numerous militants. This comes in the context of increased US drone strikes in Pakistan, partially in response to the Pakistani government's inability (or unwillingness) to deal with militants. The common assumption among observers of this conflict is that Pakistan secretly agreed to such actions but publicly denounces them.

The political logic is clear. The Pakistani government does not want to admit it cannot deal with the militant threat, and is unable to admit it actually benefits from these air strikes. So the government openly opposes these activities, counting on US dependence on both the strikes and Pakistan's tacit consent to prevent tensions with the United States. A similar move could be seen in Pakistani President Zardari's public feud with British leader David Cameron over the latter's critique of Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts, which some saw as an attempt on the part of Zardari to distract attention from government inaction on the country's horrific floods. And, as seen in some of Afghan President Karzai's actions, this rhetoric may gain Pakistan's leadership sympathy from international audiences wary of the admittedly morally-questionable drone program.

The fact that these actions by the Pakistani leadership are politically beneficial is what disturbs me. It would be one thing if this was principled opposition to military actions that could harm civilians, but I doubt it's the case. It is likely just another example of leaders who are less-than-ideal US partners using both their own people's welfare and the lives and efforts of US and allied troops for political gain.

As so often seems to be the case, I'm not surprised, but I am disappointed.

Gangsters in Algeria?

By Peter Henne

While most of the world's terrorism-related attention is fixed on Afghanistan and Pakistan, North Africa is far from quiet. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a local franchise of the core al-Qaeda group, has launched attacks throughout the region, and has taken up kidnapping-for-ransom as well as bombings. The continuing threat this group poses is evidenced in two stories this morning; Frances believes AQIM has kidnapped five French nationals, and Algerian authorities claim that ransom money from such kidnappings is a key source of funding for the group.

These terrorist activities grow out of the horrific Algerian civil war in the 1990s. AQIM was originally the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a slightly-less brutal offshoot of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), who tactics -- which included the massacres of entire villages -- upset even Osama bin Laden. Both groups had ties to AQ, and the GSPC officially merged with AQ in 2006, becoming AQIM.

Since merging with AQ, AQIM has mostly concentrated on Algeria -- where its most destructive attacks occur -- but has spread into nearby countries, including Tunisia, Mali, and Mauritania. The group threatened to attack the 2010 World Cup and claimed responsibility for an August attack against a military installation in Mauritania. At the same time, its increasing reliance not only on kidnapping, but kidnapping for profit, is a bit out of line with the globalizing "jihadist" group AQIM seems to claim to be. It is possible, then, that -- whatever the ideological justifications that launched the GSPC's activities -- AQIM's main mission now is not to create a regional Caliphate, but to survive. If this can be accomplished by launching dramatic attacks against government installations to gain international publicity, AQIM will launch them. If it can be accomplished by extorting money from families and governments of hostages, AQIM will take hostages.

The future of transnational terrorism may come to follow the path of AQIM, a mix of pragmatism, ideological appeals, and gangster-esque behavior. It is very likely the Taliban in Afghanistan are coming to resemble this model, a development that would have significant implications for US counterinsurgency strategy. Aggressive military actions against these groups will provide an ideological veneer to their warlord-ism, but withdrawing from international commitments will only give them more of an opportunity to terrorize the populace. We must ensure our response to issues like AQIM's activities in North Africa are as nuanced as these situations are complex.

Two types of corruption in Afghanistan

by Peter Henne

Things just keep getting more complicated in Afghanistan. Amid the furor over an Afghan official implicated in a high-level corruption scandal, a New York Times article revealed the official had CIA ties. Yesterday, Afghan President Hamid Karzai compared the short-lived arrest of this official to Soviet-era actions. Karzai has also established a council to initiate talks with the Taliban, and today's reporting indicates the United States is taking a permissive view on corruption in the country in order to gain allies against the insurgents.

In a counterinsurgency (or COIN) campaign--especially one in Afghanistan--some complication is to be expected. There is a trade-off between ensuring our partners in the country are virtuous and defeating the brutal insurgents threatening the Afghan people. Local elites--a.k.a. "warlords"--are essential in securing the countryside, but tend to favor private goods for their supporters over public ones. And as distasteful as it might be, some talks with the Taliban may be needed, as long as they do not involve compromising on human rights in the country.

It's important, though, that US leaders don't confuse pragmatic COIN strategies with an easy way out of Afghanistan. This is because there are two types of "corruption." The first is that of the warlords, who stabilize areas in order to profit from them; this can involve extracting resources from the populace in a less than savory manner, but also includes fighting off challengers for control--namely the Taliban. The other type is the corruption of central officials: Karzai and his ilk. It is the same concept, but on a larger scale; as long as Karzai is the most powerful authority in Afghanistan, he will continue reaping private goods. This, however, involves tolerating Taliban control of some areas in order to maintain his hold on the rest of the country, and undermining the power of local elites--who are potential competitors--even if this means a lack of security for the populace.

And thus the distinction. Letting Karzai's indiscretions slide will result in instability throughout Afghanistan, and possibly a Taliban safe-haven. Looking the other way concerning the warlords' problematic actions will not be ideal, but can help to stabilize regions under their control, even if the central government is not directly involved.

It is important as US COIN strategy progresses over the next few months that policymakers realize this distinction, and don't let the pragmatism of working with local elites translate into tolerance for Karzai's corruption.